My current research focuses primarily on doubt. I’m interested in what kind of attitude doubt is: whether it reduces to some other doxastic state, like credence, or whether it is sui generis; and in doubt’s normative profile: what norms govern doubt, and in particular, whether doubt is normatively compatible with belief. I’m currently developing an account of doubt that answers these questions through an appeal to the role of doubt in inquiry.
I also work on inquiry more broadly, and in particular on the attitudes that inquirers typically have during their inquiries, known as ‘questioning attitudes’ or ‘interrogative attitudes’ (e.g. curiosity, wonder). Again, I’m interested in what these attitudes are, and in the norms that govern them.
I have written about risk, and developed an account of epistemic anxiety as an emotional response to epistemic risk.
Publications
Articles
(2024), 'What is reasonable doubt?', with Mona Simion, Philosophical Studies.
(2024), 'Reverse-engineering risk', with Angela O'Sullivan, Erkenntnis.
(2022), ‘Epistemic anxiety and epistemic risk’, Synthese.
(2021), 'The epistemic significance of modal factors', Synthese.
Book chapters
(forthcoming), 'Doubting in philosophy', in S. Goldberg and M. Walker (eds), Philosophy with Attitude (Oxford University Press).
(2024), 'The charge of relativism: "Post-modernism" and post-truth', with Iain Campbell, in S. Truwant and T. J. Kattumana (eds.), The post-truth condition: philosophical reflections (Lexington Books).
Under review
A paper on ignorance (with Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion)
A paper on questioning attitudes
A paper on deadnaming and misgendering